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ABSTRACT
Background
Following natural disasters, mismanagement of the dead has consequences for the
psychological well-being of survivors. However, no technical guidelines currently exist for
managing mass fatalities following large natural disasters. Existing methods of mass fatality
management are not directly transferable as they are designed for transport accidents and acts
of terrorism. Furthermore, no information is currently available about post-disaster manage-
ment of the dead following previous large natural disasters.
Methods and Findings
After the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004, we conducted three descriptive case
studies to systematically document how the dead were managed in Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri
Lanka. We considered the following parameters: body recovery and storage, identification,
disposal of human remains, and health risks from dead bodies. We used participant
observations as members of post-tsunami response teams, conducted semi-structured
interviews with key informants, and collected information from published and unpublished
documents.
Refrigeration for preserving human remains was not available soon enough after the disaster,
necessitating the use of other methods such as dry ice or temporary burial. No country had
sufficient forensic capacity to identify thousands of victims. Rapid decomposition made visual
identification almost impossible after 24–48 h. In Thailand, most forensic identification was
made using dental and fingerprint data. Few victims were identified from DNA. Lack of national
or local mass fatality plans further limited the quality and timeliness of response, a problem
which was exacerbated by the absence of practical field guidelines or an international agency
providing technical support.
Conclusions
Emergency response should not add to the distress of affected communities by
inappropriately disposing of the victims. The rights of survivors to see their dead treated
with dignity and respect requires practical guidelines and technical support. Mass fatality
management following natural disasters needs to be informed by further field research and
supported by a network of regional and international forensic institutes and agencies.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Globally, there are at least six natural disasters every year
that kill more than 500 people [1]. Although management of
human remains is one of the most difﬁcult aspects of disaster
response, there are currently no technical guidelines for
dealing with large numbers of dead bodies following natural
disasters. Existing methods developed for transport accidents
and acts of terrorism are not directly transferable as they are
designed for a smaller number of victims within a criminal or
international medico-legal framework [2–4]. Developing
appropriate guidelines for natural disasters is further
complicated by the absence of information about post-
disaster management of the dead following previous disasters.
Experience from the last 25 y suggests that a common
reaction following mass fatality natural disasters is fear that
dead bodies will cause epidemics [5,6]. This fear has
frequently been used to justify rapid burial of human remains
in mass graves with no identiﬁcation [7]. Consequences of
such mismanagement include increased psychological distress
for survivors and legal problems affecting inheritance,
compensation, insurance, and re-marriage of spouses [7–9].
Diplomatic tensions may also occur when foreign tourists are
involved.
The tsunami disaster in South Asia on 26 December 2004
was one of the largest natural disasters in recent times (Table
1). Management of the dead varied remarkably between
affected countries, with the biggest international forensic
investigation in history following a natural disaster mounted
in Thailand, while in other countries, local authorities were
left to cope as best they could. The size of the disaster and the
different responses provided an important opportunity to
systematically document and learn about methods for
managing human remains following large natural disasters.
In this paper we present our ﬁndings from three case studies
in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, and make recommen-
dations for future disasters.
Methods
We used a descriptive multiple-case study design [10]. The
study was deliberately designed to compare and contrast the
management of a large number of fatalities in different
countries affected by the tsunami. Each case was a different
country. Our resources enabled us to select three countries.
We therefore selected countries with (1) a large number of
fatalities caused by the tsunami and (2) different levels of
sophistication used to manage the dead.
At the beginning of the study we determined to examine
four parameters: (1) methods of body recovery and storage,
(2) methods of victim identiﬁcation, (3) methods of disposal
of human remains, and (4) public health issues associated with
the management of a large number of dead bodies. Where
possible, we used triangulation, whereby data were sought
from different sources to supplement and validate observa-
tions. Several authors (P. S., C. P., Y. S., and D. V. A.) made
participant observations while working as members of post-
tsunami response teams in the affected countries. Semi-
structured interviews using a checklist/question prompt were
conducted with key informants by one of the authors (O. W.
M.) between 18 February and 4 March 2005. Purposive
sampling [11] was used to select individuals with operational
and managerial responsibility for the management of the
dead. Where face-to-face interviews were not possible, inter-
views were conducted by telephone or E-mail. Interviews
were conducted in English or with the aid of an interpreter
recruited in each country speciﬁcally for the study. In each
country we sought published and unpublished documents
(situation reports, ofﬁcial statistics, evaluation reports,
technical documents, guidelines for victim identiﬁcation,
and public health reports) from national ministries of health
and government ofﬁces, the World Health Organization
(WHO), non-governmental organisations, and voluntary
groups. We analysed ﬁeld and interview notes thematically
and inductively (generating ideas from the data), using the
study parameters as a framework for analysis [10,11].
Results
We selected Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia for this
study. The number of fatalities in each of these countries has
been estimated as 8,345, 35,399, and 165,708, respectively [1].
Participant observers (P. S., C. P., Y. S., and D. V. A.) spent at
least 4 wk working in affected areas. Interviews were
conducted with 40 key informants from the voluntary sector
(n¼9), ministries of health (n¼8), military (n¼6), WHO (n¼
5), police (n ¼ 5), hospital staff (n ¼ 4), and government
ofﬁcials (n¼3). Reviewed documents included WHO situation
reports (n¼37) [12], evaluation or surveillance reports (n¼4),
and technical documents (n ¼ 4).
Body Recovery and Storage
Body recovery is the ﬁrst phase of the management of dead
bodies. In all countries it was characterised as being initially
chaotic and uncoordinated, involving a large number of
different actors. In Thailand, body recovery was done by
foreign tourists, local volunteers, Thai non-governmental
organisations that specialise in body recovery following
disasters (Po-Tek-Tung Foundation and Ruam-Ka-Tan-Yu
Foundation), the military, and the police. In Indonesia, the
Table 1. Natural Disasters That Have Caused at Least 100,000
Deaths between 1900 and 2005
Estimated Number Killed Type of Disaster Country/Region Year
3,700,000 Flood China 1931
2,000,000 Flood China 1959
500,000 Flood China 1939
300,000 Cyclone Bangladesh 1970
242,000 Earthquake China 1976
226,408 Tsunami South Asia
a 2004
200,000 Earthquake China 1927
180,000 Earthquake China 1920
143,000 Earthquake Japan 1923
142,000 Flood China 1935
138,866 Cyclone Bangladesh 1991
110,000 Earthquake Soviet Union 1948
100,000 Flood China 1911
100,000 Typhoon China 1922
aBangladesh (n ¼ 2), India (n ¼ 16,389), Indonesia (n ¼ 165,708), Kenya (n ¼ 1), Malaysia
(80), Maldives (n¼102), Myanmar (n¼71), Seychelles (n¼3), Somalia (n¼298), Sri Lanka
(n ¼ 35,399), Tanzania (n ¼ 10), and Thailand (n ¼ 8,345).
Source: [1].
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030195.t001
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Tsunami Case Studiesbody recovery phase lasted several months (Figure 1), and,
under the coordination of the military, 42 different organ-
isations were involved. In Sri Lanka, body recovery was done
almost exclusively by the affected communities themselves. In
all cases, bodies were taken to multiple locations, and
relatives did not know where their family members had been
taken.
None of the countries had sufﬁcient refrigerated storage
immediately available. In Thailand, the only country able to
mobilise large numbers of refrigerated containers, it took
about 2 wk to provide about 100 containers needed to store
around 3,600 bodies. Temporary burial in shallow trench
graves (about 1 m deep) was used effectively to store about
600 bodies. Effective use of dry ice proved difﬁcult: when
placed on top of the bodies it damaged them because of its
low temperature, while not providing sufﬁcient overall
cooling to stop decomposition. Handling large quantities of
dry ice also caused many skin burns among individuals
handling it [13]. However, it was found that an effective
method was to build a small wall of dry ice surrounding a
group of bodies, and then to cover the group with a tent or
tarpaulin.
Identification
Victim identiﬁcation differed considerably between the
three countries. In Indonesia, simple visual identiﬁcation was
attempted in the ﬁrst few days. However the sheer number of
bodies meant that it was impossible to arrange viewing for all
bodies or store the bodies for later identiﬁcation. Never-
theless, the body recovery teams successfully identiﬁed over
500 victims using personal effects such as identity cards and
jewellery, and even mobile telephone SIM cards.
In Sri Lanka, the Centre for National Operations (an ad
hoc governmental disaster management committee) man-
dated that local authorities take photographs and collect
ﬁngerprints of all the victims. However, because of damaged
communications infrastructure, these instructions only ar-
rived after 2 or 3 d, by which time decomposition had
distorted facial features. In all, many hundreds of photo-
graphs were taken by police photographers, medical staff,
journalists, and freelance photographers. In some cases, the
ﬁlms were not developed as there were insufﬁcient funds to
pay either the developer or freelance photographers. There
were, however, outstanding examples, such as the hospital at
Matara, where digital photographs were taken and basic
information recorded (sex, height, and personal effects) for
each body as it was brought into the hospital. Over 87% of
the 547 victims handled by the hospital were identiﬁed [14].
Foreign victims, largely found in the eastern part of the
country, were sent directly to the capital city Colombo, where
an Identiﬁcation Centre was established with support from
the British government. During 2005, the Identiﬁcation
Centre also supervised six major exhumations to search for
missing foreigners who were buried along with Sri Lankan
nationals. A total of 155 bodies were examined by the disaster
victim identiﬁcation team. Analysis of DNA and dental
records was used to successfully identify these individuals,
who came from 18 different countries.
On 27 December, the ﬁrst Thai forensic teams, many
travelling independently under their institutes, started arriv-
ing in the affected areas of southern Thailand. They rapidly
set up basic identiﬁcation facilities in local temples. During
the ﬁrst 7–10 d of operations, Thai forensic teams examined
around 3,600 bodies. The examination included external
examination, photography, and recording of all personal
effects. Fingerprints were taken from about 600 cadavers.
DNA samples were collected from almost all bodies during
the ﬁrst few days, and included hair and soft tissues and, later,
ribs and teeth. During this initial phase, Thai forensic teams
identiﬁed about 1,100 human remains and released them to
the families. In addition, about 500 bodies were identiﬁed and
released to relatives by local physicians and police without
the support of forensic specialists.
After the ﬁrst week, forensic teams from other countries
started to arrive in Thailand. They formed an international
disaster victim identiﬁcation committee to work in collabo-
ration with the Royal Thai Police [15]. In Phuket, the
committee’s information centre was established with the
ﬁnancial support of the Australian government. The Thai
government decided to combine the efforts of the Thai
forensic experts, the Thai Royal Police, and international
disaster victim identiﬁcation committee teams, and on 13
January the Thai Tsunami Victim Identiﬁcation (TTVI)
centre was established in Phuket [16]. In collaboration with
Interpol, the TTVI established a central mortuary in Phuket,
sponsored by the Norwegian government. It was decided to
examine or re-examine all 3,777 remaining victims using
Interpol’s standard protocol [17]. This included external
examination, personal effects, photographs, ﬁngerprints,
forensic pathological examination, dental examination, and
DNA sampling from bone and teeth. As of 27 July 2005, 7 mo
after the disaster, TTVI had identiﬁed 2,010 victims, with over
1,800 cadavers remaining unidentiﬁed [18]. Sixty-one percent
of victims were identiﬁed by TTVI using dental examinations
(n ¼ 1,235), 19% using ﬁngerprint records (n ¼ 378), 1.3%
using DNA analysis (n¼26), and 0.3% using physical evidence
(n¼6). In a further 18% of cases (n¼365), more than one type
of evidence was used [19].
Disposal of Human Remains
In Thailand, unidentiﬁed victims were stored in refriger-
ated containers during identiﬁcation activities. Bodies that
were identiﬁed were disposed of by cremation or burial
according to local custom. Bodies of foreign victims were
Figure 1. Daily Number of Bodies Buried in Banda Aceh and Surrounding
Areas, 26 December 2004 to 22 February 2005
Districts include Pantai Barat, Pantai Timur, Aceh Besar, and Band Aceh.
(Source: Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana Dan
Penanganan Pengungsi—BAKORNAS PBP)
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030195.g001
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Tsunami Case Studiesrepatriated by their respective embassies. Around Banda
Aceh, Indonesia, there were 14 mass graves, the largest, at
Lambarro, reportedly containing 60,000–70,000 victims.
Finding suitable government land for these large graves was
difﬁcult, and in some instances graves were sited very close to
communities. In the areas surrounding Banda Aceh, smaller
village-level graves were often used. Many were constructed
rapidly, sometimes within the village itself. This has caused
difﬁculty for returning survivors wanting to exhume and re-
locate the graves to outside the village. In many rural areas,
there was no formal body recovery and disposal of remains.
In Sri Lanka, most human remains were buried after 3 or 4 d.
Common graves, in which bodies were buried haphazardly in
several layers, were sited largely within existing cemeteries.
However, within some Muslim communities the deceased
were buried within the ﬁrst 24 h according to custom, making
it difﬁcult for the local authorities to identify and count the
dead. Additionally, there were concerns that some of the
deceased, who were buried as Muslims, may have been from
other religious groups.
Health Impact from Dead Bodies
Shortly after the tsunami, WHO and national governments
established early warning disease surveillance. No epidemics
among the surviving populations were identiﬁed in the weeks
after the tsunami [20]. In Banda Aceh, Indonesia, it took some
2 mo to bury the thousands of bodies (Figure 1). In spite of
the prolonged presence of dead bodies, no epidemics
occurred [21]. Among individuals handling human remains
(recovery, identiﬁcation, and disposal), we did not identify
any reports of ‘‘occupational’’ infections. A health and safety
assessment of temporary morgues in Thailand by the United
States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
Thai Ministry of Public Health reported sharp-implement
injuries and mucosal splashes with body ﬂuids as well as heat
stress and dehydration due to overuse of personal protective
equipment such as respirators [13]. A questionnaire survey
conducted by the Thai Ministry of Public Health of around
200 individuals involved in body recovery did not identify any
reports of infectious disease (S. Sirituttanapruk, personal
communication). Back injuries, caused by lifting bodies into
trucks, were reported by Indonesian military. Body recovery
teams faced potential injury risk from working among debris,
especially from earthquake-damaged buildings. In Sri Lanka,
most dead bodies were taken to local hospitals, which had an
indirect health impact by disrupting the provision of medical
assistance to survivors and threatening to close hospitals
because of the smell of decomposition.
Coordination and Preparedness
In each country, a large number of individuals and
organisations were involved in managing the dead. Body
recovery involved the affected community, voluntary organ-
isations, the police, and the military. Doctors, medical staff,
and forensic specialists were involved in death certiﬁcation
and collecting post-mortem data. National police forces and
consulates or embassies were involved in collecting ante-
mortemdata(informationaboutthedeceasedcollectedbefore
death, such as dental or ﬁngerprint records). Disposal of the
bodies was done by the military or police, who also had legal
responsibility for victim identiﬁcation. No single person or
organisation had a clear mandate to coordinate the process of
collecting, identifying, and disposing of the dead, either
nationally or locally. None of the countries had mass fatality
plans.
Discussion
The technical and logistical challenges of recovering and
identifying victims after the tsunami were exceptional. The
hot climate increased the rate of decomposition: bloating and
discolouration of the human face rendered visual identiﬁca-
tion almost impossible after 24–48 h. Odours from decom-
position caused concern about epidemics, and led local
communities and national authorities to sanction mass
(unplanned) burial without identiﬁcation. Refrigeration for
preserving human remains was not available soon enough,
and no country had sufﬁcient forensic capacity to identify
thousands of victims. Lack of national or local mass fatality
plans further limited the quality and timeliness of response,
as did the absence of practical ﬁeld guidelines or an
international agency providing technical support.
Strengths and Limitations
Unlike study designs that make statistical inferences about
a population, case study designs are suitable for describing
and understanding why events occur and for generating
hypotheses for future study. Therefore, rather than select
cases to be ‘‘representative’’, we selected cases to highlight a
range of experience. A case study design was especially
appropriate in this situation because we had no previous
information about how the management of mass fatalities is
undertaken following natural disasters (and hence no a priori
hypotheses to test).
Conducting research during a humanitarian emergency
presents many challenges. For example, individuals from
relief agencies and governmental bodies have heavy work-
loads and are under considerable stress. Consequently,
allocating time to participate in research activities may be
of secondary importance. The stressful nature of disaster
response leads to a high turnover of staff, and some of the key
informants were no longer available for interview during our
ﬁeldwork. We attempted to contact these individuals by
telephone and E-mail, but this was not always possible.
Finally, we found that the management of dead bodies was
politically very sensitive, both at local and national govern-
ment levels. For these reasons, it is likely that some key
informants were not included.
Storage, Identification, and Burial
Cold storage is vital for preserving evidence for identiﬁca-
tion. None of the countries could quickly mobilise sufﬁcient
refrigerated containers after the tsunami, and in Thailand,
where refrigerated containers did eventually become avail-
able, most of the bodies had decomposed considerably by that
time. The use of dry ice was reasonably effective, but it was
difﬁcult to manage, logistically intensive, and a signiﬁcant
cause of work-related injury. An alternative is normal ice
(frozen water), as used after the Bali bombing in 2002 [22].
However, large quantities of melted water are produced that
contain products of decomposition, which are likely to create
additional management problems [22,23]. For large numbers
of dead bodies, the most practical option is temporary burial
in trench graves. The temperature underground is lower than
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org June 2006 | Volume 3 | Issue 6 | e195 0812
Tsunami Case Studiesat the surface, and burial acts as ‘‘natural refrigeration’’. At 1.2
m depth, bodies have been well preserved for several months
[24]. However, this approach must include careful recording
of the location of each body and good communications with
the public and media, who may mistakenly interpret this as
disposal of victims without identiﬁcation.
The simplest form of identiﬁcation used after the tsunami
was visual recognition and photographs of fresh bodies. In
the absence of cold storage, this needs to be done rapidly.
After 24–48 h without cooling, gases build up within the body,
swelling the face and lips and forcing the tongue out of the
mouth, making visual identiﬁcation unreliable. The epider-
mis detaches from the body, leaving un-pigmented skin,
giving the appearance of a white cadaver, even in dark-
skinned individuals [25]. Further, while visual identiﬁcation is
relatively simple, it will result in some misidentiﬁcation.
Injuries to the body, or the presence of blood, ﬂuids, or dirt,
especially around the head, will reduce the chance of correct
recognition. Following the Bali bombing, visual identiﬁcation
was incorrect in about one-third of victims [22]. The
effectiveness of this method following natural disasters is
unknown, although reports from one hospital in Sri Lanka
suggest that it can have good results [14].
Forensic techniques such as dental, ﬁngerprint, and DNA
analysis are effective because they can identify decomposed
or damaged bodies. However, for large disasters they require
many trained specialists and are resource intensive. Most
importantly, these methods are only useful if comparative
data are available. While ﬁngerprint data are recorded for
Thai citizens when identity cards are issued, and many
Western victims had dental records, comparative data may be
scarce in many parts of the world. Few countries have the
capacity for DNA collection and analysis following large
natural disasters. DNA identiﬁcation is expensive, technically
demanding, and logistically difﬁcult to implement on a large
scale [2]. In the case of the tsunami in Thailand, it proved to
be a relatively unimportant method of identiﬁcation. DNA
identiﬁcation should not be considered as a ﬁrst-line method
of identiﬁcation, but rather should only be implemented
when physical, ﬁngerprint, and dental methods have been
unsuccessful [26].
Communal burial may be necessary when the number of
human remains is large, as happened in Sri Lanka and
Indonesia. Haphazard commingling of cadavers in mass
graves makes future exhumations extremely difﬁcult. Com-
munal graves should be clearly marked, with bodies well
organised and buried in one layer. All affected countries had
difﬁculty ﬁnding locations for graves while considering the
wishes of the local community, access for relatives, and land
ownership. Although few cremations took place in the
countries studied, they should be avoided because they make
identiﬁcation exceptionally difﬁcult, require large amounts
of fuel, and rarely achieve complete incineration, necessitat-
ing burial of partially burned cadavers.
Health Risks
The fear that dead bodies will cause epidemics among
survivors, often encouraged by the media, prejudices proper
handling and identiﬁcation [6,27]. The unpredictable and
chaotic nature of disasters means epidemiological evidence
about associated infections is unavailable. A risk assessment
suggests that the risk is small for members of the public and is
primarily due to diarrhoea from drinking water contami-
nated with faecal matter from dead bodies [28]. This
assessment of low risk, along with anecdotal observations
over the last 20 y [6] and the absence of outbreaks in Banda
Aceh despite the presence of several thousand bodies, should
be considered the most convincing evidence to date that dead
bodies pose a negligible threat to the general public after
natural disasters.
Individuals who handle the dead (recovery, identiﬁcation,
and disposal) may be exposed to blood, body ﬂuids, or faeces
Box 1. Recommendations for the Management of the Dead after Natural Disasters
Health Impacts
  The health risk to the general public of large numbers of
dead bodies is negligible
  Drinking water must be treated to avoid possible diarrhoeal
diseases
  Body handlers should follow universal precautions for blood
and body fluids, wear gloves, and wash their hands
Body Storage
  Refrigerated containers provide the best storage, if available
  Temporary burial in trench graves can be used if refriger-
ation is not available
Body Identication
  Visual recognition or photographs of fresh bodies are the
simplest forms of non-forensic identication and should be
attempted after all natural disasters
  If resources and comparative data are available, simpler
methods can be supplemented by forensic techniques
(dental, fingerprint, and DNA analysis)
Body Disposal
  Communal graves may be necessary following large
disasters
  Bodies should be buried in one layer to facilitate future
exhumation
  Graves should be clearly marked
Coordination
  A named person/organisation should have an agreed
mandate to coordinate the management of dead bodies
Preparedness
  Mass fatality plans should be included in national and local
disaster preparedness activities
  Systematic documentation about how the dead are
managed in future disasters is needed to learn from them
Communications
  Close working with the media is needed to avoid
misinformation and to promote the rights of the survivors
to see their dead treated with dignity and respect
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org June 2006 | Volume 3 | Issue 6 | e195 0813
Tsunami Case Studiesthat contain chronic infections such as hepatitis B and C,
HIV, tuberculosis, and gastrointestinal pathogens [28]. Simple
precautions such as wearing gloves and washing hands will
reduce transmission and hence reduce risks considerably. We
did not identify any reports of ‘‘occupational’’ infections
among body handlers. However, considering the relatively
long incubation period for blood-borne infections and the
low likelihood of testing among these individuals, it may have
been too early to detect their incidence. Long term follow-up
of this group is needed.
Coordination and Preparedness
None of the countries had a single organisation with
jurisdiction for recovery, identiﬁcation, and disposal of
bodies. Not only did this cause tension, but also added to
the confusion and stress of relatives searching for family
members. The lack of mass fatality plans meant that these
issues had to be worked out during the response.
Recommendations and Conclusions
The South Asian tsunami in 2004 was an extreme natural
event resulting in many thousands of fatalities. Several
important lessons can be highlighted for future disasters
(Box 1). Until now, the failure to document and learn
following mass fatality natural disasters means that similar
mistakes occur time and time again. In May 2005, WHO, the
Pan American Health Organization, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent convened an
international workshop in the city of Lima, Peru, to share the
experience of the tsunami and other previous disasters and to
develop a ﬁrst responders’ manual for mass fatality natural
disasters. These practical ﬁeld guidelines were published in
April 2006 [29].
Management of the dead has important socio-cultural
implications, and emergency response should not add to the
distress of affected communities through inappropriate
handling and disposal of the victims. Promoting the rights
of the survivors to see their dead treated with dignity and
respect requires guidelines and technical support, which
must be informed by further ﬁeld research (Box 2). Moreover
it is important that the international community promotes
the rights of victims and communities by including standards
for the management of the dead in existing humanitarian
Sphere Project guidelines [30] (the Sphere Project is a
collaboration of over 400 organisations that agree on
minimum standards in disaster relief). Finally, no country
has sufﬁcient capacity to respond to very large disasters, and
networks of countries, forensic institutes, and international
agencies such as Interpol and WHO are needed to provide
assistance for the management of the dead following future
disasters.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Some 226,408 people died in the tsunami that hit
countries across South Asia on 26 December 2004. As well as providing
assistance to the living, a crucially important part of the disaster relief
effort was the recovery, identification, and disposal of the dead.
However, there is very little consensus about the best way to handle
and identify large numbers of bodies. Although natural disasters that kill
many people occur frequently, most guidelines for the management of
large numbers of dead bodies have come out of the experience gained
from transport accidents and from terrorist incidents, and these
guidelines are not directly relevant; for example, natural disasters often
cause many more deaths than transport accidents or terrorist attacks. It
is important for survivors that the bodies of the dead are handled with
respect and that the dead are identified so that survivors know what has
happened to missing relatives. However, at the same time many people
are afraid of what the effect of many dead bodies might be on the living;
one belief is that dead bodies are a source of disease. Such a belief can
lead to the inappropriately rapid burial of bodies before identification
has been done.
Why Was This Study Done? The tsunami of 2004 provided an
opportunity to study four different aspects of how the dead were
handled in a number of different countries: how the bodies were
recovered, how the bodies were identified, how the bodies were
disposed of, and what, if any, were the health effects of the large number
of bodies on survivors. The authors wanted to then use the results to
make recommendations for use in future natural disasters.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The authors interviewed in
person, in writing, and by E-mail key people involved in the handling of
the dead in three of the countries affected by the tsunami: Thailand
(where 8,345 people died), Indonesia (where 165,708 people died), and
Sri Lanka (where 35,399 people died). The authors discovered that there
were a huge number of people and agencies involved in the handling of
the dead; for example, in Indonesia 42 different organizations were
involved in recovering bodies.
None of the countries had sufficient refrigerated storage available to
store bodies until they could be identified. Some effective alternatives
were used, such as temporary burial in shallow graves—where the
temperature is lower than in the ambient air—with the intention of
exhuming the bodies later for identification. However, many bodies were
hurriedly buried in mass graves because they were decomposing; these
bodies were almost impossible to identify.
Methods and efficiency of identification varied between and within
countries. One hospital in Sri Lanka excelled by systematically photo-
graphing all bodies brought in and recording sex, height, and personal
effects: 87% of the bodies brought here were identified. But in most
areas rates of identification were much lower. It seemed that simple
methods of identification were the most useful: photographs taken
quickly before the bodies started to decompose, dental records, and
personal effects found on the bodies. DNA analysis was only useful for a
small number of bodies.
When it came to disposal of the bodies, again procedures differed
widely, and in some cases were dictated by religious needs—for
example, in some Muslim communities all bodies were buried within 24
hours, making counting and identification of the dead very difficult. Mass
graves were often used, but these caused problems; for example,
haphazard arrangement of the bodies meant that later exhumation and
identification would be impossible.
The authors concluded that there was virtually no health impact of
the dead bodies on survivors. Other studies found that there were no
epidemics among the surviving population, and that most effects were
on those who handled bodies in temporary morgues, where there were
the expected variety of sharp-implement injuries and mucosal splashes
with body fluids, along with heat stress and dehydration due to overuse
of personal protective equipment such as respirators.
What Do These Findings Mean? How efficiently bodies were handled
after the tsunami varied widely across and even within countries. The
authors conclude that much of this variety was because of a lack of
national or local plans for such mass fatalities, along with a lack of
practical field guidelines. There was little coordination of all of the
different organizations involved. However, in some places bodies were
handled very well. The authors drew on their findings to suggest
guidelines for the possible future management of large numbers of
bodies, and also suggested that further research should be done.
Reassuringly, the large numbers of bodies did not cause problems for
the survivors, so in the future survivors should be encouraged to
systematically identify the dead rather than rushing to bury them
because of fear of disease.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030195.
  The World Heath Organization has a Web page that brings together
much information on the tsunami and its aftermath
  News from the United Nations special envoy for the tsunami can be
found on its Web site
  An article published by the Pan American Health Organization called
‘‘Disaster Myths That Just Won’t Die’’
  Field guidelines for managing mass fatality natural disasters developed
by an international workshop following the tsunami
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